|
ercepting Jackson's retreat, had
abandoned the field of Groveton at 1 A.M., and, finding its position
untenable in face of superior numbers, had fallen back on Manassas;
or that Ricketts, who had by this time reached Gainesville, had in
consequence continued his retreat in the same direction.
Seldom have the baneful effects of dispersion been more strikingly
illustrated, and the difficulty, under such circumstances, of keeping
the troops in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. On the morning of
the 28th Pope had ordered his army to march in three columns on
Manassas, one column starting from Warrenton Junction, one from
Greenwich, and one from Buckland Mills, the roads which they were to
follow being at their furthest point no more than seven miles apart.
And yet at dawn on the 29th he was absolutely ignorant of the
whereabouts of McDowell's army corps; he was but vaguely informed of
what had happened during the day; and while part of his army was at
Bald Hill, another part was at Centreville, seven miles north-east,
and a third at Manassas and at Bristoe, from seven to twelve miles
south-east. Nor could the staff be held to blame for the absence of
communication between the columns. In peace it is an easy matter to
assume that a message sent to a destination seven miles distant by a
highroad or even country lanes arrives in good time. Seven miles in
peace are very short. In war, in the neighbourhood of the enemy, they
are very long. In peace, roads are easy to find. In war, it is the
exception that they are found, even when messengers are provided with
good maps and the country is thickly populated; and it is from war
that the soldier's trade is to be learned.
Jackson's army corps bivouacked in the position they had held when
the fierce musketry of Groveton died away. It was not till long after
daybreak on the 29th that his cavalry patrols discovered that King's
troops had disappeared, and that Longstreet's advanced guard was
already through Thoroughfare Gap. Nor was it till the sun was high
that Lee learned the events of the previous evening, and these threw
only a faint light on the general situation. But had either the
Commander-in-Chief or his lieutenant, on the night of the 28th, known
the true state of affairs, they would have had reason to congratulate
themselves on the success of the plan which had been hatched on the
Rappahannock. They had anticipated that should Jackson's movement on
Manassas prove success
|