ation, and driven back in disorder;
and Trimble's brigade, now reduced to a handful, became involved in
the confusion. But a vigorous charge of the second line restored the
battle. The Federals were beginning to give way. General Kearney,
riding through the murky twilight into the Confederate lines, was
shot by a skirmisher. The hostile lines were within short range, and
the advent of a reserve on either side would have probably ended the
engagement. But the rain was now falling in torrents; heavy peals of
thunder, crashing through the forest, drowned the discharges of the
two guns which Jackson had brought up through the woods, and the red
flash of musketry paled before the vivid lightning. Much of the
ammunition was rendered useless, the men were unable to discharge
their pieces, and the fierce wind lashed the rain in the faces of the
Confederates. The night grew darker and the tempest fiercer; and as
if by mutual consent the opposing lines drew gradually apart.* (* It
was at this time, probably, that Jackson received a message from a
brigade commander, reporting that his cartridges were so wet that he
feared he could not maintain his position. "Tell him," was the quick
reply, "to hold his ground; if his guns will not go off, neither will
the enemy's.")

On the side of the Confederates only half the force had been engaged.
Starke's division never came into action, and of Hill's and Lawton's
there were still brigades in reserve. 500 men were killed or wounded;
but although the three Federal divisions are reported to have lost
1000, they had held their ground, and Jackson was thwarted in his
design. Pope's trains and his whole army reached Fairfax Court House
without further disaster. But the persistent attacks of his
indefatigable foe had broken down his resolution. He had intended, he
told Halleck, when Jackson's march down the Little River turnpike was
first announced, to attack the Confederates the next day, or
"certainly the day after."

September 2.

The action at Chantilly, however, induced a more prudent mood; and,
on the morning of the 2nd, he reported that "there was an intense
idea among the troops that they must get behind the intrenchments [of
Alexandria]; that there was an undoubted purpose, on the part of the
enemy, to keep on slowly turning his position so as to come in on the
right, and that the forces under his command were unable to prevent
him doing so in the open field. Halleck must decide what