ainly, all
repressive measures will be repealed. But the realization of the
fundamental aim which the Russian Government has set itself in
Finland--_i.e._, the confirming in that land of the principle of
imperial unity--must continue, and it would be best of all if this end
were attained with the trustful cooperation of local workers under the
guidance of the sovereign to whom Divine Providence has committed the
destinies of Russia and Finland.

SERGIUS WITTE

When we talk of the means requisite for assimilating Finland we can not
help reckoning, first and foremost, with this fact, that by the will of
Russian emperors that country has lived its own particular life for
nearly a century and governed itself in quite a special manner. Another
consideration that should be taken to heart is this: the administration
of the conquered country on lines which differed from the organization
of other territories forming part of the empire, and which gave to
Finland the semblance of a separate state, was shaped by serious
causes, and did good service in the political history of the Russian
Empire. One is hardly justified, therefore, in blaming this work of
Alexander I., as is now so often done.... The annexation of Finland,
poor by nature and at that time utterly ruined by protracted wars, was
of moment to Russia, not so much from an economic or financial as from
a strategical point of view. And what in those days was important was
not its Russification, but solely the military position which it
afforded. Besides, the incorporation of Finland took place at a
calamitous juncture--for Russia. On the political horizon of Europe the
clouds were growing denser and blacker, and there was a general
foreboding of the coming events of the year 1812. If, at that time,
Czar Alexander I. had applied to Finland the methods of administration
which are wont to be employed in conquered countries, Finland would
have become a millstone round Russia's neck during the critical period
of her struggle with Napoleon, which demanded the utmost tension of our
national forces. Fear of insurrections and risings would have compelled
Russia to maintain a large army there and to spend considerable sums in
administering the country. But Alexander I. struck out a different
course. His Majesty recognized the necessity of "bestowing upon the
people, by means of internal organization, incomparably more advantages
than it had had under the sway of Sweden." And the