d not consider
that the present moment was favourable for putting into operation that
act of indulgence on the part of His Majesty. I have since received the
second copy of the same despatch; but, the circumstances having become
still more difficult, and that officer appearing to me to be always
dangerous, I await a more propitious time for putting into execution the
intentions of His Majesty. My zeal for his service has induced me to
suspend the operations of his command. I trust, Monsieur, that that
measure of prudence will obtain your Excellency's approbation. I have the
honour to be, etc., etc., etc., DECAEN."* (* This despatch was originally
published by M. Albert Pitot, in his Esquisses Historiques de
l'Ile-de-France. Port Louis, 1899.)

It will be observed that in this despatch Decaen describes the
circumstances of the colony he governed as having become "more
difficult," and Flinders as appearing to him to be "always dangerous." We
must, then, examine the circumstances to ascertain why they had become so
difficult, and why he considered that it would now be dangerous to let
Flinders go.

It is easy enough to attribute the General's refusal to obstinacy or
malignity. But his anger had cooled down by 1807; his prisoner was a
charge on the establishment to the extent of 5400 francs a year, and
Decaen was a thrifty administrator; why, then, should he apparently have
hardened his heart to the extent of disobeying the Emperor's command? The
explanation is not to be found in his temper, but in the military
situation of Ile-de-France, and his belief that Flinders was accurately
informed about it; as was, indeed, the case.

At this time Decaen was holding Ile-de-France by a policy fairly
describable as one of "bluff." The British could have taken it by
throwing upon it a comparatively small force, had they known how weak its
defences were. But they did not know; and Decaen, whose duty it was to
defend the place to the utmost, did not intend that they should if he
could prevent information reaching them. After the crushing of French
naval power at Trafalgar and the British occupation of the Cape, Decaen's
position became untenable, though a capitulation was not forced upon him
till four years later. He constantly demanded reinforcements and money,
which never came to hand. The military and financial resources of France
were being strained to prosecute Napoleon's wars in Europe. There were
neither men nor funds to spare