And do we not see that opinion is opposed to desire, pleasure
to anger, reason to pain, and that all these elements are opposed to one
another in the souls of bad men?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: And yet they must all be akin?
THEAETETUS: Of course.
STRANGER: Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and disease
of the soul?
THEAETETUS: Most true.
STRANGER: And when things having motion, and aiming at an appointed
mark, continually miss their aim and glance aside, shall we say that
this is the effect of symmetry among them, or of the want of symmetry?
THEAETETUS: Clearly of the want of symmetry.
STRANGER: But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of
anything?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
STRANGER: And what is ignorance but the aberration of a mind which is
bent on truth, and in which the process of understanding is perverted?
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as deformed and
devoid of symmetry?
THEAETETUS: Very true.
STRANGER: Then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul--the
one which is generally called vice, and is obviously a disease of the
soul...
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And there is the other, which they call ignorance, and which,
because existing only in the soul, they will not allow to be vice.
THEAETETUS: I certainly admit what I at first disputed--that there are
two kinds of vice in the soul, and that we ought to consider cowardice,
intemperance, and injustice to be alike forms of disease in the
soul, and ignorance, of which there are all sorts of varieties, to be
deformity.
STRANGER: And in the case of the body are there not two arts which have
to do with the two bodily states?
THEAETETUS: What are they?
STRANGER: There is gymnastic, which has to do with deformity, and
medicine, which has to do with disease.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice, is
not chastisement the art which is most required?
THEAETETUS: That certainly appears to be the opinion of mankind.
STRANGER: Again, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction
be rightly said to be the remedy?
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one
or many kinds? At any rate there are two principal ones. Think.
THEAETETUS: I will.
STRANGER: I believe that I can see how we shall soonest arrive at the
answer to this questi
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