suppose that there is a third
principle over and above the other two,--three in all, and not two? For
clearly you cannot say that one of the two principles is being, and yet
attribute being equally to both of them; for, if you did, whichever of
the two is identified with being, will comprehend the other; and so they
will be one and not two.'
THEAETETUS: Very true.
STRANGER: But perhaps you mean to give the name of 'being' to both of
them together?
THEAETETUS: Quite likely.
STRANGER: 'Then, friends,' we shall reply to them, 'the answer is
plainly that the two will still be resolved into one.'
THEAETETUS: Most true.
STRANGER: 'Since, then, we are in a difficulty, please to tell us what
you mean, when you speak of being; for there can be no doubt that you
always from the first understood your own meaning, whereas we once
thought that we understood you, but now we are in a great strait. Please
to begin by explaining this matter to us, and let us no longer fancy
that we understand you, when we entirely misunderstand you.' There will
be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question, either of
the dualists or of the pluralists?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
STRANGER: And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all--must
we not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by 'being'?
THEAETETUS: By all means.
STRANGER: Then let them answer this question: One, you say, alone is?
'Yes,' they will reply.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And there is something which you call 'being'?
THEAETETUS: 'Yes.'
STRANGER: And is being the same as one, and do you apply two names to
the same thing?
THEAETETUS: What will be their answer, Stranger?
STRANGER: It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who asserts the unity of
being will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question.
THEAETETUS: Why so?
STRANGER: To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but
unity, is surely ridiculous?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
STRANGER: And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything?
THEAETETUS: How so?
STRANGER: To distinguish the name from the thing, implies duality.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
STRANGER: And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be
compelled to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says that it
is the name of something, even then the name will only be the name of a
name, and of nothing else.
THEAETETUS: True.
STRANGER: And the one w
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