atch an order to the viceroy of Naples to march for the
north of Italy; and having completed his combinations, cross the
Pyrenees at the head of a Spanish army, and give the law to his far
weaker antagonist? No! nothing that could lead to an encounter with the
French king accorded with his policy, as it has been called, but more
probably with his disposition. He quits Spain, it is true, and using all
diligence, travels round France, but not too near it, and arrives in
Flanders. Here he puts himself at the head of his Germans, and
marches--against the Duke of Cleves! who had formed an alliance with his
principal enemy.

Seeing the emperor thus engaged, Francis completes a successful
campaign, taking possession of Luxembourg and other towns. At length the
sovereign of half Europe, having received news of the landing of an
English army in Picardy, resolves to venture a demonstration against
France. He therefore traverses Lorraine at the head of eighty thousand
troops, and makes himself master of Luneville: after which, hearing that
Francis had despatched his best troops to oppose Henry the Eighth, and
was waiting for himself, as the less dangerous foe, with an army of half
the strength of his own, and composed of recruits, he makes up his mind
to advance in the direction of Paris. After a fortnight's march he finds
himself in presence of the French king, to whom he sends _proposals of
peace_!

These being rejected, he continues his march; when a messenger from
Francis announces his consent to treat. Under these circumstances, does
he require the cession of Burgundy, according to the terms of the
unexecuted treaty of Madrid? Does he even stipulate for any advantage,
for any equality? No! he agrees, on the contrary, to cede Flanders to
the French, under colour of a dowry with his daughter the Infanta Maria,
who was to be married to the Duke of Orleans; or else Milan, with his
niece the daughter of the King of the Romans; and he beats a retreat
with his immense army, as if taking the benefit of a capitulation.

There is something in the result of this French campaign which appears
to explain much of Charles's previous conduct; and shows that in many
instances he was actuated by personal fear of his gallant rival. On this
occasion he did not hesitate to desert the King of England, who had no
doubt calculated on his cooeperation, as much as Charles had depended on
the diversion created by the British army. The more one reflec