he
menace of the Russian mobilization (a mobilization which there is
reason to suspect was deliberately provoked through machinations from
Berlin), started the war by an ultimatum to Russia, which was
tantamount to declaring war, on the very day on which Austria yielded.
Let it be remembered that whatever menace the Russian mobilization may
have contained was infinitely greater against Austria than against
Germany, and yet Austria, on the last day in July, 1914, declared
herself ready to negotiate.

I know something from actual and personal experience of the plotting
of the Prussian war party, and how for a full generation they had
endeavoured again and again to bring about a situation which would
force war upon the world. I know of my personal knowledge that the
stage was set for it six or seven years ago in connection with the
Agadir episode.

I know that the Pan-Germans meant to have a footing in South America,
and, once there, would have threatened and had prepared to threaten,
this very country of ours.

I know that Austria, in 1913, meant to conquer Serbia, and so informed
her then ally, Italy, believing that she could do so with impunity.

And I know that Austria did not believe that her ultimatum to Serbia
in July, 1914, would bring on a serious war.

I know it, because the week following the outbreak of the war I saw a
letter just arrived from a gentleman in high position in Austria,
connected with the Austrian Foreign Office, in which, writing to New
York under date of about July 20, 1914, he said:

"We are now passing through a nerve-wearing time because of
our difficulty with Serbia, but by the time this letter
reaches you everything will be all right again. The Serbians
have been intriguing against us these many years, and this
time they must be settled with for good and all. We shall go
in and take Belgrade, but inasmuch as we have given assurance
to Russia that we shall not permanently interfere with the
integrity and independence of Serbia, and inasmuch as neither
Russia nor her allies are ready to fight, the whole thing
will be a military promenade and will have no serious
consequences."

A defensive war! Was it a defensive war which Prussianism was thinking
of when it declined England's repeated offer for a reduction by both
countries of the building of warships; when it refused at the last
Hague conference to discuss the limitation of standing armi