one is to increase the armaments they at
present possess, let alone mobilize. But if you are not willing to
give us a fair show peaceably, then we warn you to look out for
trouble."

In my opinion, such a warning would not have had to be translated into
action, for in due course things were bound to come your way by the
very force of cause and effect. With a little skill and tact and
insight (which traits, as you will probably admit, have hardly been
outstanding features of German diplomacy since Bismarck), together
with a little patience, everything you could reasonably ask would
have been yours in the course of the next ten or fifteen years.

But if the Triple Entente had met a request in the nature of the
foregoing with a _non possumus_, or had made no reasonably acceptable
offer, and you, after final warning, had resorted to the arbitrament
of war, your case would have worn a very different aspect from the
present one. Many unprejudiced men amongst neutral people would have
looked upon your view-points and conduct as not devoid of
justification, instead of turning away with disgust from the
sophistries of your writers, who seek to demonstrate that you poor
innocent lambs were fallen upon in order to be dragged to the
slaughterhouse.

As a matter of fact, however, it is my belief that such a declaration
delivered by you to the Triple Entente, firm and determined in spirit
and meaning, but friendly and persuasive in language, would have led
not to war, but to a lasting understanding.

SUMMARY

To sum up:

1. Until ten years ago, England's relations with you were good--indeed
more than good, as is shown, for instance, by the cession of
Heligoland. If, as you assert, hate and envy and ill-will, because of
Germany's phenomenal development, and of her increasing strength and
push as a competitor in the markets of the world, had been the moving
force in shaping England's attitude towards you, the motive for
hostile conduct would have existed at that time just as at present.

As a matter of fact, England's sentiment towards Germany changed only
with your aggressive programme of naval construction, and as a
consequence of the manifestation in word, in writing and in deed, of
certain alarming and menacing tendencies, to which, it is true, more
significance and importance probably were attached abroad than in
Germany itself--more, perhaps, than they deserved.

_That programme England came to consider, naturally,