ot assert that there was an understanding between France and
Prussia last spring, and that Prussia went to war because that
arrangement assured her against loss; but we think there is nothing
irrational in the popular belief in the existence of such an
understanding, and that nothing has occurred since the middle of June
that renders that belief absurd. The contrary belief makes a fool of
Napoleon III.,--a character which not even the Emperor's enemies have
attributed to him since he became a successful man.

War began on the 15th of June, the day after that on which that bungling
body, the Bund, under Austrian influence, had resort to overt measures
against Prussia, which had suffered for some time from its covert
measures. The Germanic Confederation ceased to exist on the 14th of
June, having completed its half-century, with a little time to spare.
The declarations of war that appeared on the 18th of June,--the
anniversary of Fehrbellin, Kolin, and Waterloo, all great and decisive
Prussian battles, and two of them Prussian victories, or victories which
Prussians aided in winning,--the declarations of war, we say, were mere
formalities, and as such they were regarded. Prussia's first open
operation was taken three days before, when she invaded Saxony,--a
country in which the Austrians, had they been wise, would have had at
least a hundred thousand men within twenty-four hours after the action
of the Diet. Prussia had been prepared for war for some weeks, perhaps
months, while we are assured that Austria's preparations were far from
complete; from which, supposing the statement correct, the inference is
drawn that she did not expect Prussia to push matters to extremity. It
is more likely that she fell into the usual error of all proud
egotists,--that of estimating the capacity of a foe by her own. We
cannot think so poorly of Austrian statesmen and generals as to conclude
that they did not see war was inevitable in the latter part of May,
which gave them three weeks to mass their troops so near the Saxon
frontier as would have enabled them to cross it in a few hours after the
Diet had given itself up to their direction, before the world. As the
Diet never durst have acted thus without Austria's direct sanction,
Austria must have known that war was at hand, and she should have
prepared for its coming. Probably she did make all the preparation she
thought necessary, she supposing that Prussia would be as slow as
herself,