th that of
France; it was at the tail of the Pentarchy. On the 4th of July she had
conquered for herself the headship of that powerful brotherhood. It was
the prize of her sword, and it is on the sword that the French Emperor's
power mainly rests. He obtained his place by a free use of the military
arm, in December, 1851; he confirmed it by the use of the sword in the
Russian and Italian wars; and he purposed making a yet further use of
the weapon, had circumstances favored his plans, at the time he allowed
the Germano-Italian war to begin. Is he who took the sword to perish by
it? Is the Prussian sovereign that stronger man of whose coming
Croesus, that type of all prosperous sovereigns, was warned? Who shall
say? But as Napoleon's ascendency rested, the sword apart, upon opinion,
and not upon prescription, it is difficult to see how he can submit to a
surrender of that ascendency, and make way for one who but yesterday was
his inferior, and who, in all probability, was then ready to buy his aid
at a high price. The Emperor is old and sickly. His life seems to have
been in danger at the very time he was making his demand for an increase
of imperial territory. Years and infirmities may indispose him to enter
on a mighty war; but he thinks more of his dynasty than of himself, his
ambition being to found a reigning house. This must lead him to respect
French opinion, on his son's account; and opinion in France is anything
but friendly to Prussia. Almost all Frenchmen, from _Reds_ to
_Whites_,--Republicans, Imperialists, Orleanists, and Legitimists,--seem
to be of one mind on this point. They all agree that Prussian supremacy
is unendurable. They could have seen their country make way for England,
or Russia, or even Austria, without losing their temper altogether; but
for France to be displaced by Prussia is something that it is beyond
their philosophy to contemplate with patience. The very successes of the
Emperor tell against him under existing circumstances. He has raised
France so high, from a low condition, that a fall is unbearable to his
subjects. He has triumphed, in various ways, over nations that appeared
to be so much greater than Prussia, that to surrender the golden palm to
her is the very nadir of degradation. His loss of moral power is as
great at home as his loss of material power abroad. He has become
ridiculous, as having been outwitted by Germans, whom the French have
ever been disposed to look upon as the