oseph,
without the consent of Napoleon III., than Carthage durst have attacked
Masinissa without the consent of Rome. Prussia was not under the
supervision of France, and was and is the only great European nation
which had not then, as she has not since, been made to feel the weight
of his power; but it may be doubted, without the slightest intention to
impeach her courage, if she would have resolved upon war had she been
convinced that France was utterly opposed to such resolution, and was
prepared to show that the Empire was for peace by making war to preserve
it. The opinion was quite common, as matters became more and more
warlike with each succeeding day, that the course of Prussia had been
fixed upon and mapped out by Count Bismark and Napoleon III., and that
the former had received positive assurances that his country should not
undergo any reduction of territory should the fortune of war go against
her; in return for which he had agreed to such a "rectification of the
French frontier" as should be highly pleasing to the pride of Frenchmen,
and add greatly to the glory and the dignity of their Emperor. When news
came that Napoleon III., after peace had been resolved upon, had asked
for the cession of certain Rhenish territory,[45] the demand was
supposed to have been made in consequence of an understanding entered
into before the war by the courts of Paris and Berlin. There was nothing
unreasonable in this supposition; for Napoleon III. was so bent upon
extending the boundaries of France, and was so entirely master of the
situation, and his friendship was so necessary to Prussia, that it was
reasonable to suppose he had made a good bargain with that power.
Probably, when the secret history of the war shall be published, it will
be seen that an understanding did exist between Prussia and France, and
that Napoleon III., in August, asked for no more than it had been agreed
he should have, in June, or May, or even earlier. Why, then, did Prussia
give so firm but civil a negative in answer to his demand? and how was
it that he submitted with so much of meekness to her refusal, even
attributing his demand to the pressure of French public opinion, which
is no more strongly expressed in 1866 in favor of the acquisition of the
Rhine country, than it has been in almost any year since that country
was lost, more than half a century since? The answer is easy. Prussia,
no matter what her arrangement with France before the war,