best comparable to any men who were doing wonders at
the front. As Nationalist as Quebec, he thought of Canada as a unit in
the Empire, most of which he had seen for military reasons. Canada
could not declare war; but in the mind of Hughes the force that held
Canada and other overseas dominions within the Empire was not in trade
and tariffs, but in ships, armies and victories.

Sam Hughes failed to translate his force into power because he failed
to estimate the elements which carried him to success, and therefore
could not measure the energies that would defeat him. He never
understood what Bismarck called the "imponderables". Nature gave him
the energy; Fate the ambition: Destiny denied him the vision.

The electric energy of this nation in response to the call of war made
a flash that blinded Hughes. He seemed to think that he was the man
who was running the cataract. He had a wholesome contempt for
Kaiserism in Germany. He tried to express it by an imitation of
Kaiserism in Canada. He had a sense of relative omnipotence. He put
editors in jail, went over the heads of District commanders,
inexcusably humiliated General Lessard in command of the most important
military district in Canada, openly browbeat officers in front of their
men, played Napoleon on a white charger at the crest of a mound in
Valcartier, and trod on the official corns of his colleagues.

Such things are now somewhat blurred by perspective. At the time they
were glaringly in the spotlight as the pranks of a Jack the Giant
Killer. In December, 1914, Premier Borden made a tactical visit to the
headquarters of Military District No. 2, nominally commanded by General
Lessard.

A military writer had this to say about the Premier's speech:

". . . . He thought the accomplishment of this task (Valcartier) was a
tribute to the spirit of the people. He claimed no special credit for
his Government; inferentially it was a high compliment to the
organizing ability of the Minister of Militia, but Sir Robert deftly
left that to the imagination of his audience. . . . A curious feature
was his avoidance of any mention of the 'Minister of Militia.' When he
desired to speak of the military programme, he stated that he had
decided, after consultation with the 'Chief of Staff'. This was done
repeatedly and apparently with definite purpose. Once he mentioned the
name of Major Lessard, and a shout went up from the audience."

Further quotation i