gathers that from the debates of 1893, and
the view is in accordance with the traditional Ulster spirit, and the
spirit generally displayed by powerful minorities threatened with a Home
Rule to which they object on principle. It was the spirit displayed by
the Upper Canadian minority, in 1838-39 (_vide_ p. 101), in threatening
to leave the Empire rather than submit to Home Rule, and by the
Transvaal minority in the lukewarm and divided support given to the
half-baked Constitution of 1905, and in the hearty welcome given to the
full autonomy of 1906. How the Colonists expressed themselves matters
nothing. We must make generous allowance for hot party feeling and old
prejudices. The Canadian minorities did not really mean to call in the
United States, nor does it signify a particle that some of the
Johannesburgers vowed that anything could be borne which freed them from
the interference of a Liberal Government. These opinions are transient
and negligible. The spirit is essentially healthy. Paradox as it may
seem, the uncompromising attitude of Ulster Unionists, as voiced by the
ablest representative they ever had, Colonel Saunderson,[80] is hopeful
for the prospects of Home Rule. They fight doggedly for the Union, but I
believe they would prefer a real Home Rule to a half-measure, and in
making that choice they would show their virility and courage at its
true worth.

Where are the dangers and difficulties of exclusion? The dangers first.
I believe, from a study of events in the last twenty-five years, that
the strongest opposition to it was founded, not so much upon a
reluctance to give Ireland powers full enough to render needless her
representation at Westminster, but on a jealous desire to keep Irish
Members under surveillance, as a dangerous and intractable body of men
who would hatch mischief against the Empire if they were allowed to
disappear from sight; the same kind of instinct which urged
revolutionary Paris to stop the flight of Louis and to keep him under
lock and key. In the case of Ireland it is possible to understand the
prevalence of this instinct in 1886, though even then it was irrational
enough. But in 1911 we should be ashamed to entertain it. Irish plots
against the Empire have passed into electoral scares, and if they had
not, representation in London would be no safeguard. We should also
dismiss the more rational but groundless view that Imperial co-operation
necessitates representation in a joint