wanted the rest of Macedonia and had
virtually got it. Remained Bulgaria who, with more of Thrace than she
wanted, found herself almost entirely crowded out of Macedonia, the common
objective of all.

Faced with division _ex post facto_, the allies found their _a priori_
agreement would not resolve the situation. Bulgaria, the predominant
partner and the most aggrieved, would neither recognize the others' rights
of possession nor honestly submit her claims to the only possible arbiter,
the Tsar of Russia. Finding herself one against two, she tried a _coup de
main_ on both fronts, failed, and brought on a second Balkan war, in which
a new determining factor, Rumania, intervened at a critical moment to
decide the issue against her. The Ottoman armies recovered nearly all they
had lost in eastern and central Thrace, including Adrianople, almost
without firing a shot, and were not ill pleased to be quit of a desperate
situation at the price of Macedonia, Albania, and western Thrace.

Defeated and impoverished, the Ottoman power came out of the war clinging
to a mere remnant of its European empire--one single mutilated province
which did not pay its way. With the lost territories had gone about
one-eighth of the whole population and one-tenth of the total imperial
revenue. But when these heavy losses had been cut, there was nothing more
of a serious nature to put to debit, but a little even to credit. Ottoman
prestige had suffered but slightly in the eyes of the people. The
obstinate and successful defence of the Chataldja lines and the subsequent
recovery of eastern Thrace with Adrianople, the first European seat of the
Osmanlis, had almost effaced the sense of Osmanli disgrace, and stood to
the general credit of the Committee and the individual credit of its
military leader, Enver Bey. The loss of some thousands of soldiers and
much material was compensated by an invaluable lesson in the faultiness of
the military system, and especially the _Redif_ organization. The way was
now clearer than before for re-making the army on the best European model,
the German. The campaign had not been long, nor, as wars go, costly to
wage. In the peace Turkey gained a new lease of life from the powers, and,
profligate that she was, the promise of more millions of foreign money.

Over and above all this an advantage, which she rated above international
guarantees, was secured to her--the prospective support of the strongest
military power