any taxes upon the colonies; from which it followed that the
sole question in respect to duties laid on trade was whether they were
intended for revenue or for regulation. Intention in such matters was
of primary importance, since all duties were likely to be regulative
to some extent. It might be objected that "it will be difficult for any
persons but the makers of the laws to determine which of them are made
for regulation of trade, and which for raising a revenue." This was
true enough but at present of academic importance only, inasmuch as the
makers of the Sugar Act, the Stamp Act, and the Townshend duties had
conveniently and very clearly proclaimed their intention to be the
raising of a revenue. Yet this question, academic now, might soon become
extremely practical. The makers of laws might not always express their
intention so explicitly; they might, with intention to raise a revenue,
pass acts professing to be for regulation only; and therefore, since
"names will not change the nature of things," Americans ought "firmly
to believe... that unless the most watchful attention be exerted, a
new servitude may be slipped upon us under the sanction of usual and
respectable terms." In such case the intention should be inferred from
the nature of the act; and the Farmer, for his part, sincerely hoped
that his countrymen "would never, to their latest existence, want
understanding sufficient to discover the intentions of those who rule
over them."

Mr. Dickinson's "Farmer's Letters" were widely read and highly
commended. The argument, subtle but clear, deriving the nature of an act
from the intention of its makers, and the intention of its makers from
the nature of the act, contributed more than any other exposition to
convince Americans that they "have the same right that all states have,
of judging when their privileges are invaded."

"As much dependent on Great Britain as one perfectly free people can be
on another," the Farmer said. Englishmen might be excused for desiring
a more precise delimitation of parliamentary jurisdiction than could
be found in this phrase, as well as for asking what clear legal ground
there was for making any delimitation at all. To the first point, Mr.
Dickinson said in effect that Parliament had not the right to tax the
colonies and that it had not the right to abolish their assemblies
through which they alone could tax themselves. The second point Mr.
Dickinson did not clearly answer, al