ed as unworthy sons of the Fatherland--almost as
traitors to their country. But their predictions were confirmed by
events. The Allies were victorious in the Crimea, and even the despised
Turks made a successful stand on the line of the Danube. In spite of the
efforts of the Government to suppress all unpleasant intelligence, it
soon became known that the military organisation was little, if at all,
better than the civil administration--that the individual bravery of
soldiers and officers was neutralised by the incapacity of the generals,
the venality of the officials, and the shameless peculation of the
commissariat department. The Emperor, it was said, had drilled out of
the officers all energy, individuality, and moral force. Almost the only
men who showed judgment, decision, and energy were the officers of the
Black Sea fleet, which had been less subjected to the prevailing system.
As the struggle went on, it became evident how weak the country really
was--how deficient in the resources necessary to sustain a prolonged
conflict. "Another year of war," writes an eye-witness in 1855, "and
the whole of Southern Russia will be ruined." To meet the extraordinary
demands on the Treasury, recourse was had to an enormous issue of paper
money; but the rapid depreciation of the currency showed that this
resource would soon be exhausted. Militia regiments were everywhere
raised throughout the country, and many proprietors spent large sums in
equipping volunteer corps; but very soon this enthusiasm cooled when
it was found that the patriotic efforts enriched the jobbers without
inflicting any serious injury on the enemy.

Under the sting of the great national humiliation, the upper classes
awoke from their optimistic resignation. They had borne patiently the
oppression of a semi-military administration, and for this! The system
of Nicholas had been put to a crucial test, and found wanting. The
policy which had sacrificed all to increase the military power of
the Empire was seen to be a fatal error, and the worthlessness of
the drill-sergeant regime was proved by bitter experience. Those
administrative fetters which had for more than a quarter of a century
cramped every spontaneous movement had failed to fulfil even the narrow
purpose for which they had been forged. They had, indeed, secured a
certain external tranquillity during those troublous times when Europe
was convulsed by revolutionary agitation; but this tranquillity was