There
can be no question that, as a result both of his origin and his
training, the President is very much under the sway of English
thought and ideals. Nevertheless, his ambition to be a Peacemaker
and an _Arbiter Mundi_ certainly suggested the chance of our winning
him over to our side, in the event of our being unable to achieve
a decisive victory with the forces at our disposal. In this case,
Wilson, as the democratic leader of the strongest neutral Power,
was the most suitable person to propose and to bring about a Peace
by arrangement.
After the opening of the U-boat campaign, two alternatives remained
open to us, one of which we were compelled to choose. If the prospects
of a U-boat war promised to secure a victory, it was naturally
incumbent upon us to prosecute it with all possible speed and energy.
If, as I personally believed, the U-boat war did not guarantee a
victory, it ought, owing to the enormous amount of friction to
which it could not help giving rise, under all circumstances to
have been abandoned; for, by creating American hostility, it did
us more harm than good.
I, as the German Ambassador, in the greatest neutral State, with
the evidences of American power all about me, could not help feeling
it my duty to maintain our diplomatic relations with the United
States. I was convinced that we should most certainly lose the
war if America stepped in against us. And thus I realized ever
more and more the supreme importance of preventing this from taking
place.
My communications to the Central Government were framed with a
view to inducing them also to adopt this attitude; but they, of
course, had to form their conclusions, not from one source, but
from all the sources of information they possessed. At all events,
isolated as I was at Washington, I could not confine myself merely
to the task of furnishing my Government with information; but was
compelled on occasion to act on my own initiative, in order to
prevent any premature development in the diplomatic situation from
becoming utterly hopeless.
The policy for which I stood not only promised the negative success
of keeping America out of the war, but it also offered the only
prospect there was of obtaining, with neutral help, a Peace by
arrangement. My belief that such a peace could have been obtained
through Dr. Wilson is, of course, no longer susceptible of proof
to-day. It may perhaps sound improbable in view of the President's
behavior a
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