dinance
of secession to a direct vote of the people.
One of the most striking features in the early history of the secession
is the apparent delusion in the minds of the leaders that secession
could not result in war. Even after the firing upon Sumter, the delusion
continued to exist. Misled, perhaps, by the opinion of ex-President
Pierce,[1] the South believed that the North would be divided; that it
would not fight. It is but fair to say that the tone of a portion of the
Northern press, and the speeches of some of the Northern Democrats, and
the ambiguous way of speaking on the part of some of the Northern
Republicans rather warranted than discouraged such an opinion.
There was, however, one prominent man from Massachusetts, who had united
with the Southern leaders in the support of Breckenridge, who had wisdom
as well as wit, and who now sought to dispel this false idea. In the
month of December he was in Washington, and he asked his old associates
what it meant.
"It means," said they, "separation, and a Southern Confederacy. We will
have our independence, and establish a Southern government, with no
discordant elements."
"Are you prepared for war?" inquired Butler.
"Oh! there will be no war; the North will not fight."
"The North will fight. The North will send the last man and expend the
last dollar to maintain the government."
"But," said his Southern friends, "the North can't fight; we have too
many allies there."
"You have friends," said Butler, "in the North, who will stand by you so
long as you fight your battles in the Union; but the moment you fire on
the flag the Northern people will be a unit against you. And you may be
assured, if war comes, _slavery ends_."
Butler was far too sagacious a man not to perceive that war was
inevitable, and too sturdy and patriotic not to resist it. With a
boldness and frankness which have shown themselves through his whole
political career, he went to Buchanan; he advised and begged him to
arrest the commissioners, with whom he was then parleying, and to have
them tried for treason! Such advice it was as characteristic of Benjamin
F. Butler to give as it was of President Buchanan to disregard.
II.
But the adoption of secession ordinances and the assumption of
independent authority was not enough for the Cotton Republic. Though
they hoped to evade civil war, still they never forgot for a moment that
a conflict was not only possible, but even probab
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