creatures that can feel.
We are bound to recognise the claims of others to equal treatment with
ourselves, and any refusal or apparent refusal to do so must be
justified by a universal rule applicable to all alike. The perpetual
attempt to justify exceptions in this way is sure to end in diminishing
the number of those exceptions. If we are compelled to think much of the
position of woman in marriage, we are sure at last to come to Malachi's
declaration that God hateth putting away. If we are compelled to think
of the position of slaves, we cannot continue for ever to believe that
there are some beings with consciences and free wills, who nevertheless,
because of the accidents of their lives, have no rights at all; and we
acknowledge the righteousness of Jeremiah's denunciation of the breach
of covenant when the nobles of Judah re-enslaved those whom they had
solemnly emancipated. If we think of the nature of responsibility and
the justification of punishment, we find it impossible to believe that
an innocent man shall be rightly punished for the wrong-doing of
another, even if that other be his father or his mother; and we are
convinced that Ezekiel is speaking God's words when he proclaims on
God's behalf that 'the soul that sinneth it shall die; the son shall not
bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the
iniquity of the son.' And once more, whatever divine purpose gave the
chosen people a priority among all peoples in knowledge of divine will
and possession of divine favour, it is impossible to find any rule by
which this priority shall for ever exclude all other peoples from being
within the range of God's manifested love; and conscience cannot but
accept as a divine message that the Gentiles also shall come to the
Heavenly 'Light, and their kings to the brightness of His rising.' So
again, to turn from justice to mercy, we recognise that we are bound to
spare pain to all creatures that can feel, and this duty can only be set
aside by some higher duty which makes that pain the means to a higher
moral end. And if we are set by our consciences to seek for some rule
of universal application for this purpose, it becomes perpetually
clearer that nothing can excuse cruel punishments inflicted on criminals
or enemies, or hard-hearted indifference to the poor and the weak. Our
own nature cries out for kindness in our pain, and that very cry from
within compels our consciences to listen to the cry f
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