land could find the calm
certainty of safety, which popular apprehension demanded in the new
emergency, that had arisen while he was upholding her cause in the
northern seas. Nelson repined, but he submitted. Within four weeks his
flag was flying again, and himself immersed in professional anxieties.

War on the continent of Europe had ceased definitively with the treaty
of Luneville, between France and Austria, signed February 9, 1801.
Over four years were to elapse before it should recommence. But, as
Great Britain was to be the first to take up arms again to resist the
encroachments of Bonaparte, so now she was the last to consent to
peace, eager as her people were to have it. Malta had fallen, the
Armed Neutrality of the North had dissolved, the French occupation of
Egypt was at its last gasp. Foiled in these three directions by the
sea-power of Great Britain, unable, with all his manipulation of the
prostrate continent, to inflict a deadly wound, Bonaparte now resorted
to the threat of invasion, well aware that, under existing conditions,
it could be but a threat, yet hoping that its influence upon a people
accustomed to sleep securely might further his designs. But, though
the enchanter wove his spells to rouse the demon of fear, their one
effect was to bring up once more, over against him, the defiant form
of his arch-subverter. Both the Prime Minister, Addington, and the
First Lord of the Admiralty assured Nelson that his presence in charge
of the dispositions for defence, and that only, could quiet the public
mind. "I have seen Lord St. Vincent," he wrote the former, "and submit
to your and his partiality. Whilst my health will allow, I can only
say, that every exertion of mine shall be used to merit the
continuance of your esteem." St. Vincent, writing to him a fortnight
later, avowed frankly the weight attached to his very name by both
friend and foe. "Our negotiation is drawing near its close, and must
terminate one way or another in a few days, and, I need not add, how
very important it is that the enemy should know that _you_ are
constantly opposed to him."

The purpose of Bonaparte in 1801 is not to be gauged by the same
measure as that of 1803-1805. In 1798 he had told the then government
of France that to make a descent upon England, without being master of
the sea, would be the boldest and most difficult operation ever
attempted. Conditions had not changed since then, nor had he now the
time or the m