a being on the coast: for you cannot
move, if the French make the attempt."

Whatever weight may be attributed to this criticism on Nelson's
hastily sketched scheme, there can scarcely be any discord in the note
of admiration for the fire that begins to glow, the instant he in
thought draws near the enemy. There, assuredly, is no uncertain sound.
They must be met as soon as possible; if not strong enough to attack,
they must be watched, and company kept, till a favorable opportunity
offers. If none occur till they draw near the beach, then, "Whatever
plans may be adopted, the moment they touch our coast, be it where it
may, they are to be attacked by every man afloat and on shore: this
must be perfectly understood. Never fear the event." The resolution
shown by such words is not born of carelessness; and the man who
approaches his work in their spirit will wring success out of many
mistakes of calculation--unless indeed he stumble on an enemy of equal
determination. The insistence upon keeping the enemy under
observation, "keeping company" with them, however superior in
numbers, may also be profitably noted. This inspired his whole
purpose, four years later, in the pursuit of the French to the West
Indies--if the odds are too great for immediate attack, "We won't part
without a battle." It was the failure to hold the same principle of
action, applicable to such diverse cases, that ruined Calder in the
same campaign.

With the general views that have been outlined, Nelson hastened to his
task. His commission for the new service was dated July 24, three
weeks after his return from the Baltic. On the 25th he presented the
memorandum of operations which has been discussed, on the 26th the
Admiralty issued their instructions, and on the 27th he hoisted his
flag upon the "Unite" frigate at Sheerness. "I shall go on board this
day," he said, "in order to show we must all get to our posts as
speedily as possible." His orders, after mentioning the general reason
for creating the "Squadron on a Particular Service," as his command
was officially styled, designated the limits of his charge, coastwise,
as from Orfordness, on the Suffolk shore, round to Beachy Head, on the
Channel. On the enemy's side of the water, it extended from end to end
of the line of ports from which the especial danger of an invasion by
troops might be supposed to issue--from Dieppe to Ostend; but the
mouth of the Scheldt was implicitly included.

The dis