ut what of
that? Very probably I am wrong."

"Very probably you are; but that is not the point. The main thing is,
that you admit that it is possible to be wrong or right at all; that
there is something to be wrong or right about."

"But I don't know that I do admit it, or, at any rate, that I shall
always admit it. Probably, after changing my opinions again and again,
I shall come to the conclusion that none of them are worth anything at
all; that, in fact, there's nothing to have an opinion about; and then
I shall retire from politics altogether; and then--then how will you
get hold of me?"

"Oh," I replied, "easily enough! For you will still continue, I
suppose, to do some kind of work, and work which will necessarily
affect innumerable people besides yourself; and you will believe, I
presume, that somehow or other the work you do is contributing to some
general Good?"

"'You presume'! you do indeed presume! Suppose I believe nothing of
the kind? Suppose I deny altogether a general Good?"

"We will suppose it, if you like," I said. "And now let us go on to
examine the consequences of the supposition."

"By all means!" he said, "proceed!"

"Well," I began, "since you are still living in society, (for that, I
suppose, you allow me to assume,) you are, by the nature of the case,
interchanging with others innumerable offices. At the same time, on
the supposition we are adopting, that you deny a general Good, your
only object in this interchange will be your own Good, (in which you
admit that you do believe.) If, for example, you are a doctor,
your aim, at the highest, is to develop yourself, to increase your
knowledge, your skill, your self-control; at the lowest, it is to
accumulate a fortune; but in neither case can your purpose be to
alleviate or cure disease, nor to contribute to the advance of
science; for that would be to suppose that these ends, although they
purport to be general, nevertheless are somehow good, which is the
hypothesis we were excluding. Similarly, if you are a lawyer, you will
not set your heart on doing justice, or perfecting the law; such ends
as these for you are mere illusions; for even if justice exist at all,
it certainly is not a Good, for if it were, it would be a Good for
all, and, as we agree, there is no such thing. Men like Bentham,
therefore, to you will be mere visionaries, and the legal system as a
whole will have no sense or purport, except so far as it contributes
to sh