one thing
which we shall have to call a common Good."

"And what is that?"

"Society itself! For society is the condition indispensable to
all alike for the realization of any individual Good; and a common
condition of Good is, I suppose, in a sense, a common Good."

"Yes," he replied, "I suppose, in a sense, it is."

"Well," I said, "I want no larger admission. For under 'society' what
is not included! Sanction society, and you sanction, or at least you
admit the possibility of a sanction for every kind of common activity
and end; and the motives of men in undertaking these common activities
become a matter of comparative indifference. Whatever they are
consciously aiming at, whether it be their own Good, or the Good of
all, or, as is more probable, a varying mixture of both, the fact
remains that they do, and we do, admit a common Good, the maintenance
and development of society itself. And that is all I was concerned to
get you to agree to."

"But," said Leslie, "do you really think that there is no common Good
except this, which you yourself admit to be rather a condition of Good
than Good itself?"

"No," I replied, "that is not my view. I do not, myself, regard
society as nothing but a condition of the realization of independent,
individual Goods. On the contrary, I think that the Good of each
individual consists in his relations with other individuals. But this
I do not know that I am in a position to establish. Meantime, however,
we can, I think, maintain, that few candid men, understanding the
issue, will really deny altogether a common Good; for they will have
to admit that in society we have at the very least a common condition
of Good."

"But still," objected Leslie, "even so we have no proof that there
is a common Good, but only that most civilized men, if pressed, would
probably admit one."

"Certainly," I replied, "and I pretend nothing more. I have not
attempted to prove that there is a common Good, nor even that it is
impossible not to believe in one. I merely wished to show, as before,
that if a man disbelieves, he disbelieves, so to speak, at his own
peril. And to sum up the argument, what I think we have shown is, that
to deny a common Good is, in the first place, to deny to one's life
and action all worth except what is bound up with one's own Good, to
the complete exclusion of any Good of all. In the second place, it is
to deny all worth to every public and social institution--to religion