a character unparalleled
in the history of this war, naming and cursing, as traitors to their
country, certain particular Infantry Brigades. This document was very
properly suppressed by the Italian Government.

But where were the reserves which the High Command should have had ready
to repair the broken line? And where were the plans for retreating to
prepared positions only a short distance behind? It was well known, and
indeed it used to be another boast of the High Command, that a local
reverse would be of no great importance, seeing that there were no less
than twelve prepared lines between the Front, as it then ran, and Udine.
I have seen some of those lines with my own eyes. I know what great and
patient labour went to the making of them, and I know how strong they
were. But, when the moment came to make use of them, no one outside the
charmed circle of the High Command was in possession of the plans for
their defence, and for falling back upon them in an orderly and
systematic manner. It has been said that these plans could not have been
made known beforehand to the Subordinate Commands for fear they should
fall into the hands of spies. That would have been a small misfortune
compared to what actually befell.[1]

[Footnote 1: In fairness to General Capello, the Second Army Commander,
who had been highly and deservedly praised for the Bainsizza victory in
August, and who was one of the generals removed from his command after
Caporetto, it should be stated that on the latter occasion he was away
from the Front on leave.]

When, owing to the omissions of the High Command, the break in the line
was swiftly widened and the whole defensive scheme of the Second Army
collapsed, it is true that confusion and panic began to spread through
the Second Army like fire through dry grass. But it is not within the
power of common soldiers, and especially of simple unlettered peasantry,
such as most of these soldiers were, to repair the blunders of bad Staff
work, and to make for themselves, on the spur of the moment and in face
of deadly peril, plans which trained brains should have elaborated long
before, at leisure and in safe secluded places. When leadership fails,
the best troops fail too. But let one who comes of a nation, none of
whose troops have ever acted as those troops of the Italian Second Army
acted in those dreadful days, throw the first stone at Italy. That
nation will be hard to find. It is not of this world.