d in the Kaiser is accepted also by
Baron Beyens.

Whatever may be the truth in this matter, neither the German nor the French
nor our own Government can then have abandoned the effort at peaceable
settlement. For, in fact, by the summer of 1914, agreements had been made
between the Great Powers which settled for the time being the questions
immediately outstanding. It is understood that a new partition of African
territory had been arranged to meet the claims and interests of Germany,
France, and England alike. The question of the Bagdad railway had been
settled, and everything seemed to favour the maintenance of peace, when,
suddenly, the murder of the Archduke sprang upon a dismayed Europe the
crisis that was at last to prove fatal. The events that followed, so far
as they can be ascertained from published documents, have been so fully
discussed that it would be superfluous for me to go over the ground again
in all its detail. But I will indicate briefly what appear to me to be the
main points of importance in fixing the responsibility for what occurred.

First, the German view, that England is responsible for the war because she
did not prevent Russia from entering upon it, I regard as childish, if it
is not simply sophistical. The German Powers deliberately take an action
which the whole past history of Europe shows must almost certainly lead to
a European war, and they then turn round upon Sir Edward Grey and put the
blame on him because he did not succeed in preventing the consequences of
their own action. "He might have kept Russia out." Who knows whether he
might? What we do know is that it was Austria and Germany who brought her
in. The German view is really only intelligible upon the assumption that
Germany has a right to do what she pleases and that the Powers that stand
in her way are by definition peacebreakers. It is this extraordinary
attitude that has been one of the factors for making war in Europe.

Secondly, I am not, and have not been, one of the critics of Sir Edward
Grey. It is, indeed, possible, as it is always possible after the event, to
suggest that some other course might have been more successful in avoiding
war. But that is conjecture, I, at any rate, am convinced, as I believe
every one outside Germany is convinced, that Sir Edward Grey throughout the
negotiations had one object only--to avoid, if he could, the catastrophe of
war.

Thirdly, the part of Austria-Hungary is perfectly clear.