on, announced
on the 28th July, at a table next mine at the Hotel Bristol, that the
Russian artillery was neither good nor complete, while that of the German
army had never been of such superior quality. It would be folly on the
part of Russia, the great maker of guns concluded, to dare to make war
on Germany and Austria in these conditions.[4]

But while the attitude of the German Foreign Office and (as I am inclined
to suppose) of the Kaiser may have been that which I have just suggested,
there were other and more important factors to be considered. It appears
almost certain that at some point in the crisis the control of the
situation was taken out of the hands of the civilians by the military.
The position of the military is not difficult to understand. They believed,
as professional soldiers usually do, in the "inevitability" of war, and
they had, of course, a professional interest in making war. Their attitude
may be illustrated from a statement attributed by M. Bourdon to Prince
Lichnowsky in 1912[5]: "The soldiers think about war. It is their business
and their duty. They tell us that the German army, is in good order, that
the Russian army has not completed its organization, that it would be a
good moment ... but for twenty years they have been saying the same thing,"
The passage is significant. It shows us exactly what it is we have to dread
in "militarism." The danger in a military State is always that when a
crisis comes the soldiers will get control, as they seem to have done on
this occasion. From their point of view there was good reason. They knew
that France and Russia, on a common understanding, were making enormous
military preparations; they knew that these preparations would mature by
the beginning of 1917; they knew that Germany would fight then at a less
advantage; they believed she would then have to fight, and they said,
"Better fight now." The following dispatch of Baron Beyens, dated July
26th, may probably be taken as fairly representing their attitude:--

To justify these conclusions I must remind you of the opinion which
prevails in the German General Staff, that war with France and Russia is
unavoidable and near, an _opinion which the Emperor has been induced to
share_. Such a war, ardently desired by the military and Pangerman party,
might be undertaken to-day, as this party think, in circumstances which
are extremely favourable to Germany, and which probably will not