ise to
give the visit up, as there were grounds for believing that an
assassination had been planned. We knew little or nothing of all this at
the time, in The Hague. Anxiously we waited for light under the black
cloud. It came like lightning in the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia of
July 23, 1914.

It was made public the next day. I remember coming home that evening
from a motor-drive through the dead cities of the Zuyder Zee. Taking up
the newspaper in the quiet library, I read the note. The paper dropped
from my hand, and I said to my son: "That means an immense war. God
knows how far it will go and how long it will last."

This Austrian ultimatum was so severe in matter and in manner as to
justify the comment of Sir Edward Grey: "Never have I seen one state
address to another independent state a document of so formidable a
character." It not only dictated a public confession of guilt; it also
made a series of ten sweeping demands on Servia, one of which (No. 5)
seemed to imply a surrender of independent sovereignty; and it allowed
only forty-eight hours for an unqualified, complete acceptance.

Russia promptly declared that she would not object to the punishment of
Servians for any proved offense, but that she must defend the
territorial integrity and independence of Servia. Italy and France
suggested an extension of time for the answer. France and Russia advised
Servia to make a general acceptance of the ultimatum. She did so in her
reply of the 25th, reserving demand No. 5, which she said she did not
understand, and offering to submit that point, or the whole matter, to
the tribunal at The Hague. Austria had instructed her minister at
Belgrade to reject anything but a categorical submission to the
ultimatum. When the Servian reply was handed to him he said that it was
not good enough, demanded his passports, and left the capital within
half an hour. Germany, vowing that she had no knowledge of the text of
the Austrian note before it was presented and had not influenced its
contents (which seems incredible, as I shall show later), nevertheless
announced that she approved and would support it.

Verily this was "miching mallecho," as Hamlet says. It meant mischief.
Austria was inflexible in her purpose to make war on Servia. Russia's
warning that in such a case she could not stand aside and see a small
kindred nation subjugated, and her appeals for arbitration or four-power
mediation, which Great Britain, France,