chose Austria as its ally. For, though Austria and Russia had once
been friends and for a short time even allies, conditions had
changed and in modern times the interests of the two countries had
become so conflicting that an alliance was entirely out of the
question.

After France and Russia had gotten together it was not long before
England found it necessary to choose between these two international
groups. That in spite of its close racial relation to the Germanic
countries it preferred the Gallo-Slavic combination, was due to a
number of reasons. In the first place it was found easier to adjust
whatever conflicts there were between England on the one side and
France and Russia on the other than those in existence between
England and Germany. In the second place English modern culture was
clearly more interested in and more influenced by French than by
German achievements. And last, but not least, an alliance between
Germany and England became impossible, because in such an alliance
neither country would have gracefully yielded the leadership to the
other, whereas in an Anglo-Franco-Russian concert all England had to
do was to signify its willingness to join and the leadership was
England's without question or contest. It was England, then, which
gave up its international isolation later than any of the others.
But it did not lose thereby; for just as its Franco-Russian alliance
assured to it cooperation against the Triple Alliance, if such
cooperation was needed, it secured to itself protection for its
immense Far Eastern interests by an alliance with the new world
power of the Far East, Japan.

The outbreak of the war of 1914, then, saw these two great groups of
nations: The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy,
and the Quadruple Entente of England, France, Russia and Japan. To
foretell the result of the gigantic struggle in international
relations is obviously impossible. Its end may bring a revival of
internationalism on a greater scale than ever before, it may result
in a new and severe separatism, it may cause a rearrangement of the
present alliances or it may simply mean a return to the _status quo_
of August, 1914.

PART II--THE BALKANS

CHAPTER XII

THE BALKAN PEOPLES

While it is of course impossible to assign the causes of the Great
War to any one circumstance, there can be no doubt that at least one
of the chief causes may be found in that snarl of diplomatic
intrigue