currency with a definite standard into which every general rule may
be translated. There is always a common measure applicable in every
formula for the estimation of conduct. If you admit your Moral Sense,
you profess to settle values by some standard which has no definite
relation to the standard which in fact governs the normal transactions.
But any such double standard, in which the two measures are absolutely
incommensurable, leads straight to chaos. Or, if again you appeal to
reason in the abstract, you are attempting to settle an account by pure
arithmetic without reference to the units upon which your operation is
performed. Two pounds and two pounds will make four pounds whatever a
pound may be; but till I know what it is, the result is nugatory.
Somewhere I must come upon a basis of fact, if my whole construction is
to stand.

This is the fundamental position implied in Bentham's doctrine. The
moral judgment is simply one case of the judgment of happiness. Bentham
is so much convinced of this that to him there appeared to be in reality
no other theory. What passed for theories were mere combinations of
words. Having said this, we know where to lay the foundations of the new
science. It deals with a vast complicity of facts: it requires
'investigations as severe as mathematical ones, but beyond all
comparison more intricate and extensive.'[365] Still it deals with
facts, and with facts which have a common measure, and can, therefore,
be presented as a coherent system. To present this system, or so much of
it as is required for purposes of legislation, is therefore his next
task. The partial execution is the chief substance of the
_Introduction_. Right and wrong conduct, we may now take for granted,
mean simply those classes of conduct which are conducive to or opposed
to happiness; or, in the sacred formula, to act rightly means to promote
the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The legislator, like
every one else, acts rightly in so far as he is guided by the principle
(to use one of the phrases coined by Bentham) of 'maximising' happiness.
He seeks to affect conduct; and conduct can be affected only by annexing
pains or pleasures to given classes of actions. Hence we have a vitally
important part of his doctrine--the theory of 'sanctions.' Pains and
pleasures as annexed to action are called 'sanctions.' There are
'physical or natural,' 'political, 'moral or popular,' and 'religious'
sanctions. The 'phys