be given. Other proofs, however,
may at once be rendered superfluous by appealing to 'the uninterrupted
and most notorious experience of the United States.'[443] To that happy
country he often appeals indeed[444] as a model government. In it, there
is no corruption, no useless expenditure, none of the evils illustrated
by our 'matchless constitution.'

The constitution deduced from these principles has at least the merit of
simplicity. We are to have universal suffrage, annual parliaments, and
vote by ballot. He inclines to give a vote to women.[445] There is to be
no king, no house of peers, no established church. Members of parliament
are not to be re-eligible, till after an interval. Elaborate rules
provide for their regular attendance and exclusive devotion to their
masters' business. They are to be simply 'deputies,' not
'representatives.' They elect a prime minister who holds office for four
years. Officials are to be appointed by a complex plan of competitive
examination; and they are to be invited to send in tenders for doing the
work at diminished salary. When once in office, every care is taken for
their continual inspection by the public and the verification of their
accounts. They are never for an instant to forget that they are
servants, not the masters, of the public.

Bentham, of course, is especially minute and careful in regard to the
judicial organisation--a subject upon which he wrote much, and much to
the purpose. The functions and fees of advocates are to be narrowly
restricted, and advocates to be provided gratuitously for the poor. They
are not to become judges: to make a barrister a judge is as sensible as
it would be to select a procuress for mistress of a girls' school.[446]
Judges should be everywhere accessible: always on duty, too busy to have
time for corruption, and always under public supervision. One
characteristic device is his quasi-jury. The English system of requiring
unanimity was equivalent to enforcing perjury by torture. Its utility as
a means of resisting tyranny would disappear when tyranny had become
impossible. But public opinion might be usefully represented by a
'quasi-jury' of three or five, who should not pronounce a verdict, but
watch the judge, interrogate, if necessary, and in case of need demand a
rehearing. Judges, of course, were no longer to make law, but to propose
amendments in the 'Pannomion' or universal code, when new cases arose.

His leading principle may