l; and the differences which must
be taken into account for the moment can be removed by judicious means.
Without pausing to illustrate this from the Essay, I may remark that for
many purposes such an assumption is justifiable and guides ordinary
common sense. If we ask what would be the best constitution for a
commercial company, or the best platform for a political party, we can
form a fair guess by arguing from the average of Bentham and his
contemporaries--especially if we are shrewd attornies or political
wirepullers. Only we are not therefore in a position to talk about the
'science of human nature' or to deal with problems of 'sociology.' This,
however, gives Bentham's 'individualism' in a sense of the phrase
already explained. He starts from the 'ready-made man,' and deduces all
institutions or legal arrangements from his properties. I have tried to
show how naturally this view fell in with the ordinary political
conceptions of the time. It shows, again, why Bentham disregards
history. When we have such a science, empirical or _a priori_, history
is at most of secondary importance. We can deduce all our maxims of
conduct from the man himself as he is before us. History only shows how
terribly he blundered in the pre-scientific period. The blunders may
give us a hint here and there. Man was essentially the same in the first
and the eighteenth century, and the differences are due to the clumsy
devices which he made by rule of thumb. We do not want to refer to them
now, except as illustrations of errors. We may remark how difficult it
was to count before the present notation was invented; but when it has
once been invented, we may learn to use it without troubling our heads
about our ancestors' clumsy contrivances for doing without it. This
leads to the real shortcoming. There is a point at which the historical
view becomes important--the point, namely, where it is essential to
remember that man is not a ready-made article, but the product of a long
and still continuing 'evolution.' Bentham's attack (in the _Fragment_)
upon the 'social contract' is significant. He was, no doubt, perfectly
right in saying that an imaginary contract could add no force to the
ultimate grounds for the social union. Nobody would now accept the
fiction in that stage. And yet the 'social contract' may be taken to
recognise a fact; namely, that the underlying instincts upon which
society alternately rests correspond to an order of reasons fr