news, but expressed the
opinion that there was no evidence that war had been decided upon, and
that the action of the American commodore had been in conformity with
previous orders not to permit foreign cruisers within the waters of
the United States. Some color was lent to this view by the
circumstance that the "Belvidera" was reported to have been off Sandy
Hook, though not in sight of land.[492] In short, the British Cabinet
officially assumed that facts were as they wished them to continue;
the course best adapted to insure the maintenance of peace, if
perchance not yet broken.

On July 29, however, definite information was received that the United
States Government had declared that war existed between the two
countries. On the 31st the Cabinet took its first measures in
consequence.[493] One order was issued forbidding British merchant
vessels to sail without convoy for any part of North America or the
West Indies; while another laid an embargo on all American merchant
ships in British ports, and directed the capture of any met at sea,
unless sailing under British licenses, as many then did to Continental
ports. No other hostile steps, such as general reprisals or commercial
blockade, were at this time authorized; it was decided to await the
effect in the United States of the repeal of the obnoxious Orders in
Council. This having taken place only on June 23, intelligence of its
reception and results could not well reach England before the middle
of September. When Parliament was prorogued on July 30, the speech
from the throne expressed a willingness still "to hope that the
accustomed relations of peace and amity between the two countries may
yet be restored."

It is a coincidence, accidental, yet noteworthy for its significance,
that the date of the first hostile action against the United States,
July 31, was also that of the official promulgation of treaties of
peace between Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden.[494] Accompanied as
these were with clauses embodying what was virtually a defensive
alliance of the three Powers against Napoleon, they marked that turn
of the tide in European affairs which overthrew one of the most
important factors in the political and military anticipations of the
United States Administration. "Can it be doubted," wrote Madison on
September 6, "that if, under the pressure added by our war to that
previously felt by Great Britain, her Government declines an
accommodation, it will be