ng conscientious conviction, or national
welfare, or the interests of posterity, of which each generation in
its day is the trustee, then war is not justifiable only; it is
imperative. In these days of glorified arbitration it cannot be
affirmed too distinctly that bodies of men--nations--have convictions
binding on their consciences, as well as interests which are vital in
character; and that nations, no more than individuals, may surrender
conscience to another's keeping. Still less may they rightfully
pre-engage so to do. Nor is this conclusion invalidated by a triumph
of the unjust in war. Subjugation to wrong is not acquiescence in
wrong. A beaten nation is not necessarily a disgraced nation; but the
nation or man is disgraced who shirks an obligation to defend right.

From 1803 to 1814 Great Britain was at war with Napoleon, without
intermission; until 1805 single handed, thenceforth till 1812 mostly
without other allies than the incoherent and disorganized mass of the
Spanish insurgents. After Austerlitz, as Pitt said, the map of Europe
became useless to indicate distribution of political power.
Thenceforth it showed a continent politically consolidated, organized
and driven by Napoleon's sole energy, with one aim, to crush Great
Britain; and the Continent of Europe then meant the civilized world,
politically and militarily. How desperate the strife, the author in a
previous work has striven fully to explain, and does not intend here
to repeat. In it Great Britain laid her hand to any weapon she could
find, to save national life and independence. To justify all her
measures at the bar of conventional law, narrowly construed, is
impossible. Had she attempted to square herself to it she would have
been overwhelmed; as the United States, had it adhered rigidly to its
Constitution, must have foregone the purchase of the territories
beyond the Mississippi. The measures which overthrew Napoleon
grievously injured the United States; by international law grievously
wronged her also. Should she have acquiesced? If not, war was
inevitable. Great Britain could not be expected to submit to
destruction for another's benefit.

The author has been indebted to the Officers of the Public Records
Office in London, to those of the Canadian Archives, and to the Bureau
of Historical Research of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, for
kind and essential assistance in consulting papers. He owes also an
expression of personal obli