constitutions generally, as things distinct from
actual governments, let us proceed to consider the parts of which a
constitution is composed.

Opinions differ more on this subject than with respect to the whole.
That a nation ought to have a constitution, as a rule for the conduct
of its government, is a simple question in which all men, not directly
courtiers, will agree. It is only on the component parts that questions
and opinions multiply.

But this difficulty, like every other, will diminish when put into a
train of being rightly understood.

The first thing is, that a nation has a right to establish a
constitution.

Whether it exercises this right in the most judicious manner at first
is quite another case. It exercises it agreeably to the judgment it
possesses; and by continuing to do so, all errors will at last be
exploded.

When this right is established in a nation, there is no fear that it
will be employed to its own injury. A nation can have no interest in
being wrong.

Though all the constitutions of America are on one general principle,
yet no two of them are exactly alike in their component parts, or in the
distribution of the powers which they give to the actual governments.
Some are more, and others less complex.

In forming a constitution, it is first necessary to consider what are
the ends for which government is necessary? Secondly, what are the best
means, and the least expensive, for accomplishing those ends?

Government is nothing more than a national association; and the
object of this association is the good of all, as well individually as
collectively. Every man wishes to pursue his occupation, and to enjoy
the fruits of his labours and the produce of his property in peace
and safety, and with the least possible expense. When these things
are accomplished, all the objects for which government ought to be
established are answered.

It has been customary to consider government under three distinct
general heads. The legislative, the executive, and the judicial.

But if we permit our judgment to act unincumbered by the habit of
multiplied terms, we can perceive no more than two divisions of power,
of which civil government is composed, namely, that of legislating or
enacting laws, and that of executing or administering them. Everything,
therefore, appertaining to civil government, classes itself under one or
other of these two divisions.

So far as regards the execution of the laws