nvey to its owner the right of
voting, or by its death take it from him, in whom does the origin of
such a right exist? Is it in the man, or in the mule? When we consider
how many ways property may be acquired without merit, and lost without a
crime, we ought to spurn the idea of making it a criterion of rights.

But the offensive part of the case is, that this exclusion from the
right of voting implies a stigma on the moral char* acter of the persons
excluded; and this is what no part of the community has a right to
pronounce upon another part. No external circumstance can justify it:
wealth is no proof of moral character; nor poverty of the want of it.
On the contrary, wealth is often the presumptive evidence of dishonesty;
and poverty the negative evidence of innocence. If therefore property,
whether little or much, be made a criterion, the means by which that
property has been acquired ought to be made a criterion also.

The only ground upon which exclusion from the right of voting is
consistent with justice, would be to inflict it as a punishment for a
certain time upon those who should propose to take away that right from
others. The right of voting for representatives is the primary right by
which other rights are protected. To take away this right is to reduce
a man to slavery, for slavery consists in being subject to the will of
another, and he that has not a vote in the election of representatives
is in this case. The proposal therefore to disfranchise any class of men
is as criminal as the proposal to take away property. When we speak
of right, we ought always to unite with it the idea of duties: rights
become duties by reciprocity. The right which I enjoy becomes my duty
to guarantee it to another, and he to me; and those who violate the duty
justly incur a forfeiture of the right.

In a political view of the case, the strength and permanent security
of government is in proportion to the number of people interested in
supporting it. The true policy therefore is to interest the whole by
an equality of rights, for the danger arises from exclusions. It is
possible to exclude men from the right of voting, but it is impossible
to exclude them from the right of rebelling against that exclusion; and
when all other rights are taken away, the right of rebellion is made
perfect.

While men could be persuaded they had no rights, or that rights
appertained only to a certain class of men, or that government was a
thi