ituated as to have little to fear from each other, while they
might impart many mutual advantages. The harbors of Portugal gave
shelter as well as supplies to the English fleet, while the latter
defended the rich trade of Portugal with Brazil. The antipathy between
Portugal and Spain made it necessary for the former to have an ally,
strong yet distant. None is so advantageous in that way as England,
which in her turn might, and always has, derived great advantages from
Portugal in a war with any of the southern powers of Europe."

This is an English view of a matter which to others looks somewhat
like an alliance between a lion and a lamb. To call a country with a
fleet like England's "distant" from a small maritime nation like
Portugal is an absurdity. England is, and yet more in those days was,
wherever her fleet could go. The opposite view of the matter, showing
equally the value of the alliance, was well set forth in the memorial
by which, under the civil name of an invitation, the crowns of France
and Spain ordered Portugal to declare against England.

The grounds of that memorial--namely, the unequal benefit to Portugal
from the connection and the disregard of Portuguese neutrality--have
already been given. The King of Portugal refused to abandon the
alliance, for the professed reason that it was ancient and wholly
defensive. To this the two crowns replied:--

"The defensive alliance is actually an offensive one by the
situation of the Portuguese dominions and the nature of the
English power. The English squadrons cannot in all seasons keep
the sea, nor cruise on the principal coasts of France and Spain
for cutting off the navigation of the two countries, without the
ports and assistance of Portugal; and these islanders could not
insult all maritime Europe, if the whole riches of Portugal did
not pass through their hands, which furnishes them with the
means to make war and renders the alliance truly and properly
offensive."

Between the two arguments the logic of situation and power prevailed.
Portugal found England nearer and more dangerous than Spain, and
remained for generations of trial true to the alliance. This
relationship was as useful to England as any of her colonial
possessions, depending of course upon the scene of the principal
operations at any particular time.

The preliminaries of peace were signed at Fontainebleau, November 3,
1762; the definitive trea