e or distracted by the occurrences on
board his own ship, and that his signals could be better seen.[126]
This position, resembling somewhat that of a general on shore, being
remote from personal risk, was also assumed by Lord Howe in 1778; but
both that officer and the French abandoned the practice later. Nelson
at Trafalgar, the end of his career, led his column; but it may be
doubted whether he had any other motive than his ardor for battle. The
two other great attacks in which he commanded in chief were directed
against ships at anchor, and in neither did he take the head of the
column; for the good reason that, his knowledge of the ground being
imperfect, the leading ship was in most danger of grounding. The
common practice in the days of broadside sailing-ships, except when a
general chase was ordered, was for the admiral to be in the line, and
in the centre of it. The departure from this custom on the part of
both Nelson and Collingwood, each of whom led his own columns at
Trafalgar, may have had some reason, and an ordinary man rather
shrinks from criticising the action of officers of their eminence. The
danger to which were exposed the two senior officers of the fleet,
upon whom so much depended, is obvious; and had any serious injury
befallen their persons, or the head of their columns, the lack of
their influence would have been seriously felt. As it was, they were
speedily obliterated, as admirals, in the smoke of the battle, leaving
to those who came after them no guidance or control except the
brilliancy of their courage and example. A French admiral has pointed
out that the practical effect of the mode of attack at Trafalgar, two
columns bearing down upon a line at right angles to them, was to
sacrifice the head of the columns in making two breaches in the
enemy's line. So far, very well; the sacrifice was well worth while;
and into these breaches came up the rear ships of each column, nearly
fresh, forming in fact a _reserve_ which fell upon the shattered ships
of the enemy on either side of the breaks. Now this idea of a reserve
prompts a thought as to the commander-in-chief. The size of his ship
was such as precluded its being out of the order; but would it not
have been well had the admiral of each column been with this reserve,
keeping in his hands the power of directing it according to the
chances of the action, making him a reality as well as a name for some
time longer, and to a very useful purpose