seems to me, if we are never to use force. I interceded for a few powerful
steamers, with 68 pound carronades, and I think Lord Melville seemed
inclined to acquiesce.

Questions are to be put to Polignac to ascertain what he would do in
certain events. I said he never would open himself to Lord Stuart. It was
then suggested by the Duke that Aberdeen could write a private letter. This
will, I believe, be done. I said to Fitzgerald, who was next to me,
'Neither letter nor Stuart will get anything out of Polignac. One of
ourselves should go to Paris as an individual, see Polignac, and return
before the Conference.'

I suggested Rosslyn, as he had nothing to do. Fitzgerald said he could go
and return in a week, and seemed to wish to do so. However, nothing was
said openly; and with all the means of success in our hands, for, I think,
Polignac _might_ be brought into our views, we shall lose all by not using
proper instruments; just as we have lost the Greek question by persisting
in keeping Stratford Canning.

We had a good deal of conversation as to the limits of Greece. The Duke was
for adhering to the Morea. It was _really_ the best line. It was what we
had guaranteed. We had told the Turks we did not mean to go beyond it.

Aberdeen has always had a little private hankering after Athens, though he
ridicules it. He had no scruple about annexing Athens, although not yet
taken. I said I thought Polignac would be disposed to hold our language to
Russia, if we would make some concession on the subject of Greece, and
enable him to settle that question with _eclat_. He would then be supported
by France in any strong language he might hold, and would establish himself
by the experiment of his first fortnight of office.

However, the Cabinet seems disposed to look at accessories, not at
principles, at the minor objects rather than at _the one great object_,
which is inducing France to act with us to prevent the occupation of
Constantinople or to force its evacuation. Instead of yielding upon points
of minor importance, in order to carry the question, we are to insist now
on the minor points-the evacuation of the Morea by the French, and then, I
fear we shall weaken Polignac's Government, and lose our object.

Our foreign policy has certainly been, most unsuccessful. We have succeeded
in nothing.

The communication to be made to Polignac is to be made to him
confidentially, and he is to know it is not to be made to Austria