the other line. Polignac was a more able man than people
supposed, and he would adhere to the course he adopted. We might endeavour,
at any rate, to ascertain his feelings and intentions.

As to the Greek question we must have a conference, and consider the
suggestions of the Ambassadors, namely, that whatever we chose to make
Greece, should be declared independent, and guaranteed. Both the Duke and
Aberdeen thought France and Russia would both take the proposition into
consideration. The former as to _limits_, the latter for delay. France had
already told us that, provided we could agree upon the limits, she was
inclined to adopt the suggestion of the Ambassadors.

We asked whether the permanent occupation of Constantinople by Russia was
to be submitted to? The answer was, _No_, to be opposed by war. It seemed
to me and to Fitzgerald we had better endeavour to prevent, at a small
expense, even if alone, a measure we could only retrieve if it took place
at an enormous expense, if at all, and which would in all probability
effect the ruin of the Turkish Empire. I did not think affairs quite so
desperate. I thought the Russians might get to Adrianople, but not to
Constantinople, and that they could not maintain themselves at Adrianople
without the command of the sea. We had six ships at the mouth of the
Dardanelles, and these with the Turkish Fleet would open the Black Sea.

I was for passing our ships up to Constantinople and placing them at the
disposal of the Ambassador, for from hence we cannot give orders adapted to
circumstances. It was replied _that_ would be war. If war were to be
declared we should do as much mischief as possible, and go to Cronstadt,
not to the Black Sea. We should have our ships beyond the Bosphorus when
Russia occupied the Dardanelles, and shut us in. This would make us
ridiculous.

As the object is not to do mischief to Russia, but to save the Turkish
Empire, I should say that measure was to be effected at the Bosphorus, for
Constantinople, once taken, and the Ottoman Power annihilated, it would be
of no use to distress Russia.

Fitzgerald seemed to be of my opinion that, however desperate the chance,
we should do all we could to save Constantinople, and at any risk.

It was determined that our fleet in the Mediterranean should be reinforced
by three or four line-of-battle ships, on the principle that wherever any
Power had a large force, we should have one--not a very wise principle, it