eclared to be "of such a nature, that it is incapable of being
introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but ONLY BY POSITIVE
LAW.... it is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it but
positive law." Adopting the same principle, the Supreme Court of the
State of Mississippi, a tribunal of slaveholders, asserted that "slavery
is condemned by reason and the Laws of Nature. It exists, and can ONLY
exist, through municipal regulations." So also declared the Supreme
Court of Kentucky and numerous other tribunals. This aspect of the
subject furnished Sumner occasion for a masterly array of all the
utterances in favor of liberty to be found in the Constitution, in the
Declaration of Independence, in the constitutional conventions, in the
principles of common law. All these led up to and supported the one
grand conclusion that, when Washington took the oath as President of the
United States, "slavery existed nowhere on the national territory"
and therefore "is in no respect a national institution." Apply the
principles of the Constitution in their purity, then, and "in all
national territories slavery will be impossible. On the high seas,
under the national flag, slavery will be impossible. In the District of
Columbia, slavery will instantly cease. Inspired by these principles,
Congress can give no sanction to slavery by the admission of new slave
States. Nowhere under the Constitution can the Nation by legislation or
otherwise, support slavery, hunt slaves, or hold property in man.... As
slavery is banished from the national jurisdiction, it will cease to
vex our national politics. It may linger in the States as a local
institution; but it will no longer engender national animosities when it
no longer demands national support."
The second part of Sumner's address dealt directly with the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1860. It is much less convincing and suggests more of the
characteristics of the special pleader with a difficult case. Sumner
here undertook to prove that Congress exceeded its powers when it
presumed to lay down rules for the rendition of fugitive slaves, and
this task exceeded even his power as a constitutional lawyer.
The circumstances under which Sumner attacked slavery were such as to
have alarmed a less self-centered man, for the two years following the
introduction of the Nebraska bill were marked by the most acrimonious
debate in the history of Congress, and by physical encounters,
challenges,
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