ding churches throughout the South began to preach the doctrine
that slavery is a divinely ordained institution, and by the time of the
decision in the Dred Scott case a whole generation had grown up under
such teaching.

A large proportion of Southern leaders had become thoroughly convinced
of the righteousness of their peculiar system. Not otherwise could they
have been so successful in persuading others to accept their views.
Even before the Dred Scott decision had crystallized opinion, Franklin
Pierce, although a New Hampshire Democrat of anti-slavery traditions,
came, as a result of his intimate personal and political association
with Southern leaders, to accept their guidance and strove to give
effect to their policies. President Buchanan was a man of similar
antecedents, and, contrary to the expectation of his Northern
supporters, did precisely as Pierce had done. It is a matter of record
that the arguments of the Chief Justice had captivated his mind before
he began to show his changed attitude towards Kansas. In August,
1857, the President wrote that, at the time of the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, slavery already existed and that it still existed
in Kansas under the Constitution of the United States. "This point,"
said he, "has at last been settled by the highest tribunal known in
our laws. How it could ever have been seriously doubted is a mystery."
Granted that slavery is recognized as a permanent institution in
itself--just and of divine ordinance and especially united to one
section of the country--how could any one question the equal rights of
the people of that section to occupy with their slaves lands acquired
by common sacrifice? Such was undoubtedly the view of both Pierce and
Buchanan. It seemed to them "wicked" that Northern abolitionists should
seek to infringe this sacred right.

By a similar process a majority of the Supreme Court justices had become
converts to Calhoun's newly announced theory of 1847. It undoubtedly
seemed strange to them, as it did later to President Buchanan, that any
one should ever have held a different view. If the Court with the force
of its prestige should give legal sanction to the new doctrine, it
would allay popular agitation, ensure the preservation of the Union, and
secure to each section its legitimate rights. Such apparently was the
expectation of the majority of the Court in rendering the decision.
But the decision was not unanimous. Each judge presented