hile the government
which used it had no support but a band of bigoted fanatics or political
adventurers; without any legal authority over the nation, or any moral
hold on the army, detested, threatened, discordant, exposed to the
resistance of its own upholders, to the treachery of its own members,
and living only from day to day, it could maintain itself only through a
brutal absolutism and permanent terror, while the public power of which
the first care is the protection of property, consciences, and lives,
became in its hands the worst of persecutors, robbers, and murderers.

III. In 1799, the undertaking more difficult and the materials worse.

Twice in succession had the experiment been tried, the monarchical
constitution of 1791, and the republican constitution of 1795; twice in
succession had the same events followed the same course to attain the
same end; twice in succession had the theoretical, cunningly-devised
machine for universal protection changed into an efficient and brutal
machine for universal oppression. It is evident that if the same machine
were started the third time under analogous conditions, one might expect
to see it work in the same manner; that is to say, contrary to its
purpose.

Now, in 1799, the conditions were analogous, and even worse, for the
work which the machine had to do was not less, while the human materials
available for its construction were not so good.--Externally, the
country was constantly at war with Europe; peace could not be secured
except by great military effort, and peace was as difficult to preserve
as to win. The European equilibrium had been too greatly disturbed;
neighboring or rival States had suffered too much; the rancor and
distrust provoked by the invading revolutionary republic were too
active; these would have lasted a long time against pacified France even
after she had concluded reasonable treaties. Even should she abandon a
policy of propaganda and interference, return brilliant acquisitions,
cease the domination of protectorates, and abandon the disguised
annexation of Italy, Holland, and Switzerland, the nation was still
bound to keep watch under arms. A government able to concentrate all its
forces--that is to say, placed above and beyond all dispute and promptly
obeyed-was indispensable, if only to remain intact and complete, to keep
Belgium and the frontier of the Rhine.--Likewise internally, and for no
other purpose than to restore civil or