ons sur la
Revolution Francaise," 4th part, ch. 18. (Napoleon's conduct with M. de
Melzi, to destroy him in public opinion in Milan, in 1805.)]

[Footnote 1246: Madame de Remusat, I., 106; II., 247, 336: "His means
for governing man were all derived from those which tend to debase him.
... He tolerated virtue only when he could cover it with ridicule."]

[Footnote 1247: Nearly all his false calculations are due to this
defect, combined with an excess of constructive imagination.--Cf. De
Pradt, p.94: "The Emperor is all system, all illusion, as one cannot
fail to be when one is all imagination. Whoever has watched his course
has noticed his creating for himself an imaginary Spain, an imaginary
Catholicism, an imaginary England, an imaginary financial state, an
imaginary noblesse, and still more an imaginary France, and, in late
times, an imaginary congress."]

[Footnote 1248: Roederer, III., 495. (March 8, 1804.)]

[Footnote 1249: Ibid., III., 537 (February 11, 1809.)]

[Footnote 1250: Roederer, III., 514. (November 4, 1804.)]

[Footnote 1251: Marmont, II., 242.]

[Footnote 1252: "Correspondance de Napoleon," I. (Letter to Prince
Eugene, April 14, 1806.)]

[Footnote 1253: M. de Metternich, I., 284.]

[Footnote 1254: Mollien, III., 427.]

[Footnote 1255: "Notes par le Comte Chaptal": During the Consulate, "his
opinion not being yet formed on many points, he allowed discussion
and it was then possible to enlighten him and enforce an opinion once
expressed in his presence. But, from the moment that he possessed
ideas of his own, either true or false, on administrative subjects,
he consulted no one;... he treated everybody who differed from him in
opinion contemptuously, tried to make them appear ridiculous, and often
exclaimed, giving his forehead a slap, that here was an instrument far
more useful than the counsels of men who were commonly supposed to be
instructed and experienced... For four years, he sought to gather around
him the able men of both parties. After this, the choice of his agents
began to be indifferent to him. Regarding himself as strong enough to
rule and carry on the administration himself, the talents and character
of those who stood in his way were discarded. What he wanted was valets
and not councillors... The ministers were simply head-clerks of the
bureaus. The Council of State served only to give form to the decrees
emanating from him; he ruled even in petty details. Everybody around him