(ib.).

In this statement, to my mind, Dunlap concedes far more than James did
in his later theory. I see no reason to suppose that "the knower for
different items is one and the same," and I am convinced that this
proposition could not possibly be ascertained except by introspection of
the sort that Dunlap rejects. The first of these points must wait until
we come to the analysis of belief: the second must be considered now.
Dunlap's view is that there is a dualism of subject and object, but that
the subject can never become object, and therefore there is no awareness
of an awareness. He says in discussing the view that introspection
reveals the occurrence of knowledge: "There can be no denial of the
existence of the thing (knowing) which is alleged to be known or
observed in this sort of 'introspection.' The allegation that the
knowing is observed is that which may be denied. Knowing there certainly
is; known, the knowing certainly is not"(p. 410). And again: "I am
never aware of an awareness" (ib.). And on the next page: "It may sound
paradoxical to say that one cannot observe the process (or relation) of
observation, and yet may be certain that there is such a process: but
there is really no inconsistency in the saying. How do I know that there
is awareness? By being aware of something. There is no meaning in the
term 'awareness' which is not expressed in the statement 'I am aware of
a colour (or what-not).'"

But the paradox cannot be so lightly disposed of. The statement "I am
aware of a colour" is assumed by Knight Dunlap to be known to be true,
but he does not explain how it comes to be known. The argument against
him is not conclusive, since he may be able to show some valid way of
inferring our awareness. But he does not suggest any such way. There is
nothing odd in the hypothesis of beings which are aware of objects, but
not of their own awareness; it is, indeed, highly probable that young
children and the higher animals are such beings. But such beings cannot
make the statement "I am aware of a colour," which WE can make. We have,
therefore, some knowledge which they lack. It is necessary to Knight
Dunlap's position to maintain that this additional knowledge is purely
inferential, but he makes no attempt to show how the inference is
possible. It may, of course, be possible, but I cannot see how. To my
mind the fact (which he admits) that we know there is awareness, is ALL
BUT decisive against his theory, a