;
for the present I am only concerned to combat his denial of images. This
denial is set forth both in his book on "Behavior" and in an article
called "Image and Affection in Behavior" in the "Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology and Scientific Methods," vol. x (July, 1913). It seems to me
that in this matter he has been betrayed into denying plain facts in
the interests of a theory, namely, the supposed impossibility of
introspection. I dealt with the theory in Lecture VI; for the present I
wish to reinforce the view that the facts are undeniable.

Images are of various sorts, according to the nature of the sensations
which they copy. Images of bodily movements, such as we have when we
imagine moving an arm or, on a smaller scale, pronouncing a word,
might possibly be explained away on Professor Watson's lines, as really
consisting in small incipient movements such as, if magnified and
prolonged, would be the movements we are said to be imagining. Whether
this is the case or not might even be decided experimentally. If there
were a delicate instrument for recording small movements in the mouth
and throat, we might place such an instrument in a person's mouth and
then tell him to recite a poem to himself, as far as possible only in
imagination. I should not be at all surprised if it were found that
actual small movements take place while he is "mentally" saying over
the verses. The point is important, because what is called "thought"
consists mainly (though I think not wholly) of inner speech. If
Professor Watson is right as regards inner speech, this whole region
is transferred from imagination to sensation. But since the question
is capable of experimental decision, it would be gratuitous rashness to
offer an opinion while that decision is lacking.

But visual and auditory images are much more difficult to deal with in
this way, because they lack the connection with physical events in the
outer world which belongs to visual and auditory sensations. Suppose,
for example, that I am sitting in my room, in which there is an empty
arm-chair. I shut my eyes, and call up a visual image of a friend
sitting in the arm-chair. If I thrust my image into the world of
physics, it contradicts all the usual physical laws. My friend reached
the chair without coming in at the door in the usual way; subsequent
inquiry will show that he was somewhere else at the moment. If regarded
as a sensation, my image has all the marks of the supernat