issitudes to which men and battles are exposed. And now
May is come with her buds and blooms, May, when, as your Majesty knows,
the heart of every good honest German turns to thoughts of beer-gardens
and draughts of foaming liquid, and so far as the capture of Verdun and
the opening of the road to Paris are concerned we have done nothing that
has any value except for our foes, who have had the satisfaction of
seeing us beat ourselves to fragments against the steel wall of their
defence. It must be confessed that German blood and German courage have
been miserably wasted, and not even our resources, great as they are,
can much longer stand the strain which has been imposed upon them.

Your Majesty asks me what under these circumstances it is best to do.
Shall we break off our attacks at Verdun and direct our hammer-blows at
some other part of the front? Theoretically there is much to be said
from the purely military standpoint for such a course; but can your
Majesty foresee what the moral effect would be upon our troops in the
field and upon the Germans still left behind us in Germany? We might, of
course, announce that we had now gained everything we had set out to
gain, that the French had lost immense numbers of killed and wounded,
that we had taken in unwounded prisoners the equivalent of an army
corps, that our booty was incalculable, and that, in fact, the victory
was definitely ours. But would Germany believe this statement--
REVENTLOW, of course, would believe it, but then he would believe
anything--and above all would the French believe it? I can promise your
Majesty that they would believe nothing of the sort, and that they would
give some excellent reasons for their disbelief. And the result would be
that we should be held not only to have acknowledged our failure, but
also to have made ourselves ridiculous in the sight of the whole world.
That, I am certain, would be intolerable for your Majesty and for the
German people, who have been fed upon a diet of victory, and would be
beyond measure disquieted by such an admission of failure as I have
mentioned. No, the only thing to do, now that we have been so deeply
involved, is to persist in the struggle and hope that we may in the end
wear out enemies who have hitherto shown no signs of fatigue.

Fortunately it cannot be said that your Majesty is involved in this lack
of the success we all hoped for. Though you are nominally the chief
Commander of our Armies it i