e in Plato. Plato wrote
in his Republic, referring to all judicial offices: "It is as if on
board ship a man were made a pilot for his wealth. Can it be that such a
rule is bad in every other calling, and good only in respect of the
governing of a republic?"

Montesquieu answers Plato (and in anticipation Voltaire) very wittily:
"Plato is speaking of a virtuous republic and I of a mere monarchy.
Under a monarchy if offices were not sold by rule, the poverty and greed
of courtiers would sell them all the same, and chance after all will
give a better result than the choice of a prince."

To sum up, Montesquieu wants the magistracy to be partly hereditary, and
partly recruited from the wealthy classes, an independent, aristocratic
body analogous to the army or the clergy, administering justice with
that technical efficiency which university standards can guarantee, and
with the moral efficiency which is founded on independence, dignity,
public spirit and impartiality.

I said above that venality, or the system of purchase, was not necessary
to obtain these results. The principle is this, that the magistracy must
be independent, and to be independent it must have a proprietary right
in its duties. This can only be obtained if it hold its office by
inheritance or purchase as was done under the _ancien regime_; or, if it
were somehow contrived that magistrates should not be chosen by the
Government. The purchase or inheritance plan is not popular, then the
only alternative is that the magistrates should be chosen by some body
other than the Government. By whom then? The people? Then the judges
would be dependent upon the people and the electors.

--That would be better, or less bad.--

Not at all. If the judges were chosen by the electors, they would be
even less impartial than if they were elected by the Government. The
judge then would think of nothing but of being re-elected. He would
always give judgment in favour of the party which had elected him.
Would you care to be judged before a court composed of the deputies of
your department? Certainly not, if you belong to the weaker party. Yes,
if you belong to the majority, but then only if you are certain that
your adversary belongs to the minority, or, if he belong to your own
party, that he is a less influential elector than yourself. To sum up,
there is no guarantee of impartiality if the judges are elected.

Further, if the system of electing judges by those liable