of themselves, it may not be
improper to examine, even in this place, whether by restoring the
house of Austria to its ancient greatness, we shall promote our own
happiness, or that of the empire, or of the rest of Europe.

To ourselves, my lords, I do not see what assistance can be given in
time of danger by this house, however powerful, or however friendly;
for, I suppose, we shall never suffer it to grow powerful by sea as
well as by land, and by sea only can we receive benefits or injuries.
What advantages the rest of Europe may promise themselves from the
restoration of the Austrian power, may be learned, my lords, from the
history of the great emperour, Charles the fifth, who for many years
kept the world in continual alarms, ranged from nation to nation with
incessant and insatiable ambition, made war only for the extinction of
the protestant religion, and employed his power and his abilities in
harassing the neighbouring princes, and disturbing the tranquillity of
mankind.

Nor did his successours, my lords, though weakened by the division of
his dominions, enjoy their power with greater moderation, or exert it
to better purposes. It is well known, that they endeavoured the
subversion of both the liberties and religion of the subordinate
states of the empire, and that the great king of Sweden was called
into Germany, as well for the preservation of the protestant religion,
as of the rights of the electors.

This, my lords, is so generally known and confessed, that Puffendorf,
the best writer on the German constitution, has declared it
disadvantageous to the empire to place at its head a prince too
powerful by his hereditary dominions, since they will always furnish
him with force to oppress the weaker princes; and it is not often
found, that he who has the power to oppress, is restrained by
principles of justice.

It appears, therefore, to me, my lords, that the late election of an
emperour was made with sufficient regard to the general good; and
that, therefore, neither policy nor equity oblige us to act in a
manner different from the other powers who are joined in the same
engagements, of whom I do not learn, by any of the common channels of
intelligence, that any of them intend the support of the Pragmatick
sanction; for no newspaper or pamphlet has yet informed us, that any
of the other powers are hiring auxiliaries, or regulating the march of
their troops, or making any uncommon preparations, which ma