dence, that they feel them in every part which is exposed to the
evils of a naval war; that they are in pain wherever they are
sensible; that they are wounded wherever they are not sheltered from
our blows, by the interposition of the nations of the continent.

If we examine, my lords, the influence of our European armaments, we
shall find that their ships of war are shut up in the harbour of
France, and that the fleets of both nations are happily blocked up
together, so that they can neither extricate each other by concerted
motions, in which our attention might be distracted, and our force
divided, nor by their united force break through the bars by which
they are shut up from the use of the ocean.

But this, my lords, however important with respect to us, is perhaps
the smallest inconvenience which the Spaniards feel from our naval
superiority. They have an army, my lords, in Italy, exposed to all the
miseries of famine, while our fleet prohibits the transportation of
those provisions which have been stored in vessels for their supply,
and which must be probably soon made defenceless by the want of
ammunition, and fall into the hands of their enemies without the
honour of a battle.

But what to the pride of a Spaniard must be yet a more severe
affliction, they have on the same continent a natural confederate, who
is yet so intimidated by the British fleets, that he dares neither
afford them refuge in his dominions, nor send his troops to their
assistance. The queen, amidst all the schemes which her unbounded
ambition forms for the exaltation of her family, finds her own son,
after having received a kingdom from her kindness, restrained from
supporting her, and reduced to preserve those territories which she
has bestowed upon him, by abandoning her from whom he received them.

These, my lords, are the inconveniencies which the Spaniards feel from
our fleets in the Mediterranean; and even these, however embarrassing,
however depressing, are lighter than those which our American navy
produces. It is apparent, that money is equivalent to strength, a
proposition of which, if it could be doubted, the Spanish monarchy
would afford sufficient proof, as it has been for a long time
supported only by the power of riches. It is, therefore, impossible to
weaken Spain more speedily or more certainly, than by intercepting or
obstructing the annual supplies of gold and silver which she receives
from her American provinces, by wh